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Green: <i>Erie</i> and Constitutional Structure

ERIE AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE: AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
Craig Green*
Only a few cases in American law have their own birthday
celebrations. Over the years, there have been temporally benchmarked
events to commemorate Marbury, Brown, Miranda, Roe, Chevron, and a
few other iconic decisions. 1 This symposium for Erie’s 80th anniversary
is similarly distinctive, and I would like to start by considering what
qualifies judicial rulings for such memorialization in doctrinal history.
Year after year, the continuous stream of new cases never runs dry, yet

* James E. Beasley Professor of Law, Temple University; Ph.D., Princeton University; J.D., Yale
Law School. Many thanks for comments on earlier drafts by Jane Baron, Pamela Bookman, Andrea
Monroe, and Rachel Rebouché. Thanks also to Owen Healy, Colin Kane, Linda Levinson, and Bryan
Shapiro for excellent research assistance.
1. E.g., Symposium, Erie Railroad at Seventy-Five, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1 (2013);
Symposium, Law Without Lawmakers, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655 (2013) (including several
analyses of Erie on the decision’s seventy-fifth anniversary); The Golden Anniversary Year: Erie R.R.
Co. v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 1988 AALS Proceedings 1, 130 (1988); see, e.g., Marbury
v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105 (2003), Symposium, Judging Judicial
Review: Marbury in the Modern Era, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2557 (2003), Symposium: Brown at Fifty,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (2004); Symposium, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years of
Legal and Social Debate, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005); Samuel W. Calhoun, Roe at 40: The
Controversy Continues, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 817 (2014); Symposium, Fifty Years of
International Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 513 (1995);
Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut, Privacy Laws Today, 47 CONN. L.
REV. 971 (2015); Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of Miranda v. Arizona, 97 B.U. L. REV. 681
(2017); Symposium, Twenty Years After: The Impact of the Chevron Decision Upon the Development
of Federal Environmental Law, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L. J. 1 (2005); see also, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The
Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988); Mary Kay Kane, The Golden Wedding Year: Erie Railroad Company v.
Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (1988); James A. Gorrell & Ithamar
D. Weed, Erie Railroad: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L. J. 276 (1948); Joseph L. Lenihan, Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins – After Fifty Years, 53 KY. BENCH & B. 22 (1989); Richard D. Freer, Erie’s
Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087 (1989).
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some rulings hold persistent spots in the legal pantheon, with
corresponding recognition on a grand historical calendar.
Although it may not be possible to fully explain why particular iconic
cases tower over the rest, there are a few general characteristics that are
worth mentioning. For instance, any legal community that commemorates
a judicial decision almost certainly believes that it accomplished
something singular and distinctive. An iconic case cannot simply
represent a long line of precedent, and a smooth arc of case law would not
produce a specific moment to celebrate. On the contrary, there must be a
dramatic break with a pre-decisional past or some extraordinary
application of existing doctrine to unconsidered facts.
Likewise, cases with anniversary celebrations must represent
something larger than themselves. That is why iconic decisions often
include grand or indeterminate language, which allows future generations
to interpret and reinterpret doctrinal meanings under variable
circumstances. Debates over iconic cases, insofar as they remain iconic,
are never truly resolved, and that is partly the point. Interpretations tend
to cycle and develop, raising new questions and answers, even as they
shift and readjust to meet new interpretive priorities.2
Erie satisfies all of those criteria, and this essay will sketch some of
the decision’s history as a jurisprudential icon before concluding with a
few theoretical issues about the stability of judicial precedents as a form
of legal authority. The most important thing to understand about Erie is
that the iconic decision today is not what it used to be, and the case might
not remain in the future what it is right now. 3 Changes in political context,
judicial personnel, economic consequences, and even academic
commentary have all combined to determine Erie’s doctrinal meaning
over time. And in turn, that process will continue onward for as long as
any legal community cares enough to notice. Happy birthday, Erie!
This essay proceeds in five steps, which will identify themselves
individually as they unfold. The first step is to describe Erie’s original
reception in 1938. Everyone knows that the Court addressed a political
and pragmatic problem about judicial management, while declaring a
constitutional principle that litigants and contemporary commentators
2. See Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory of Interpreting Precedents,
94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016).
3. For similarly historicized accounts of Erie, see EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2d ed. 2000); TONY FREYER, HARMONY &
DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); and Daniel R. Ernst,
Thinking Like a Historian: Erie in the Dimension of Time, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 719 (2001) (book
review).
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never contemplated or proposed. 4 During the years that followed,
however, the Supreme Court relied on Erie many times to resolve
important technical issues, without mentioning Erie’s original holding as
a matter of constitutional law. 5
Likewise, legal commentators in Erie’s first decade expressed some
mixture of confusion and resistance with respect to the Court’s
constitutional reasoning. In 1938, editors at the Harvard Law Review were
stunned by the Court’s startling avowal that Swift v. Tyson was
unconstitutional, describing with remarkable charity: “the gratuitous
courage of the Court and the fluidity of the Constitution.” 6 Only students
who studied law during the New Deal Court’s switch in time could so
unequivocally celebrate the kind of radical courage and unprincipled

4. Green, supra note 3, at 430
[T]he lawyers in Swift argued their case as though it were a mountain, but the Court
decided a molehill. The opposite was true in Erie. No lawyer had suggested that ‘the oftchallenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson should be disapproved.’ Nor did anyone but the
Supreme Court foresee that as even a possibility. The district judge—a Roosevelt
appointee hearing his first civil case—had applied federal general common law without
hesitation. And a Second Circuit panel that included Learned Hand and Thomas Swan had
unanimously used federal general common law with casual confidence.”
(footnotes omitted) By contrast, many pre-Erie commentators had objected to federal general
common law on practical and political grounds. See e.g., CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (Felix Frankfurter & Wilber G. Katz eds., Callaghan & Co.
1931) (compiling pragmatic critiques); see also Green, supra note 2, at 424–26.
5. For an early set of post-Erie Supreme Court cases that applied the decision’s result without
invoking its constitutional rationale, see, for example, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945);
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Vandenbark v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538
(1941); Stoner v. New York Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940); West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies of California v. Joint Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180
(1940); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280 (1940);
Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat. Bank of
Wichita Falls, 306 U.S. 103 (1939); and Ruhlin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938). Cf.
Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (applying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without
invoking constitutional limits). The only opinions that I have found from this era to explicitly discuss
constitutional arguments were dissenting opinions from Justice Rutledge, and in any event, Rutledge
was highly dubious of those arguments’ merit. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 558 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
[Erie] held that district courts in diversity cases must apply state law, decisional as well as
statutory, in determining matters of substantive law . . . . I accept that view generally and
insofar as it involves a wise rule of administration for the federal courts, though I have
grave doubt that it has any solid constitutional foundation.
Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 117 (“I cannot say . . . . as was said in the Erie case [about state
negligence standards], that the matter [of state statutes of limitations in equity cases] is beyond the
power of Congress to control.”)
6. Commentary, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1245, 1217-1220 (1938) (emphasis added).
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fluidity that later generations might have described as judicial activism.7
Just a few years later, a different group of Harvard student editors would
express skepticism and resignation about Erie’s original logic, forecasting
with weary sophistication that, “[d]espite attacks on its constitutional
basis, queries as to its historical validity, and criticisms of its
jurisprudential assumptions, Erie R. R. v. Tompkins is probably here to
stay.” 8
The reaction of Solicitor General Robert Jackson to Erie’s
constitutional reasoning was tepid from the start. 9 In a public lecture,
Jackson endorsed the decision’s result as “one of the most dramatic
episodes in the history of the Supreme Court,” but he insisted that “the
Court might well have avoided resort to statutory or constitutional
grounds, and placed its decision solely on the grounds of sound practice
for the Federal courts.” 10 Likewise, Charles McCormick and Elvin Hale
Hewins wrote in 1938 that Erie’s constitutional arguments were on
jurisprudentially quaky ground and represented a vulnerable “Achilles
tendon of the opinion.” 11 The authors criticized Justice Brandeis as a
hypocrite because, despite general admonitions that judges should avoid
unnecessary constitutional issues, “he seems in his anxiety to attain ends
which he believes desirable, to depart from standards which he thinks
should control others.” 12
In 1941, practitioner Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn wrote an extensive
article that canvassed eighteenth-century historical materials before
concluding that Erie’s “revolution in our jurisprudence” amounted to a
constitutional “amendment by [judicial] decision.” 13 In Broh-Kahn’s
view, that kind of radical jurisprudential action “may be wise or unwise.
7. See Craig Green, An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism, 58 EMORY L.J. 1195 (2009).
8. How a Federal Court Determines State Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1299, 1299 (1946).
9. See Robert H. Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift v. Tyson, 24 A.B.A. J. 609 (1938).
10. Id. at 644; cf. T.A. Cowan, Constitutional Aspects of the Abolition of Federal Common
Law, 1 LA. L. REV. 161 (1938) (suggesting that the only plausible constitutional argument—though
paradoxical in its mixture of statutory and constitutional authority—was that federal courts under
Swift v. Tyson had unconstitutionally failed to apply the Rules of Decision Act).
11. Charles T. McCormick & Elvin Hale Hewins, Collapse of “General” Law in the Federal
Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 133–34 (1938).
12. Id. at 134–35; see also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345–48
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (1936) (“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question, although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may
be disposed of.”). See generally Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 103 (1944)
(Frankfurter, J.) (“If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of
constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless
such adjudication is unavoidable.”).
13. Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Amendment by Decision—More on the Erie Case, 30 KY. L. J.
3, 3 (1941).
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It may even be an usurpation of power by the judiciary. The important
thing is that it should be recognized when it occurs. If unwise, it can then
be corrected.” 14 Broh-Kahn thought that judicial self-correction was
certainly appropriate for Erie because any practical problems under Swift
should have been addressed “as a matter of comity or independent
appraisal and decision rather than by reason of any non-existent
constitutional . . . compulsion.” 15
In 1946, Judge Charles Clark heaped more criticism on Erie’s
constitutional reasoning: “[a]mong many troublesome features of the
opinion [the Court’s constitutional argument] is perhaps the most
troublesome; at least commentators have found it so.” 16 Clark generalized
with remarkable breadth, claiming that the Court’s constitutional
objection to Swift v. Tyson “has always puzzled commentators, who have
been wont to consider the statement as a dictum,” even as he noticed that
Erie’s original approach “seems to have been rather carefully avoided by
the Court ever since.” 17 Clark obviously misread the Erie Court’s
constitutional rhetoric in declaring that “dictum it surely seems to be.” 18
But for present purposes, Clark’s interpretation also highlights how
unsatisfactory he found the Court’s arguments as a matter of substantive
law.
Helen Silving—who would become the United States’ first female
law professor—was more resigned to Erie’s constitutional reasoning than
Judge Clark. 19 In 1946, she wrote with notable emphasis: “Clearly,
constitutional provisions mean what the Supreme Court, in its latest
decision, says they mean, and the [holding of the] Supreme Court in Erie
v. Tompkins, . . . however fallacious, was thereby transformed into law.” 20
She continued, “[o]nce a jurisprudential doctrine has been proclaimed to
be law in the proper form of the law, its fallacious doctrinal source does
not impair its validity as law. By being incorporated into the law, it ceases

14. Id. at 57.
15. Id. at 60; cf. Lawrence Earl Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Run Riot—Extensions of the Erie Case,
31 KY. L.J. 99 (1943) (offering substantive criticism of the Supreme Court’s post-Erie decisions,
despite noting that the latter rulings did not repeat Erie’s constitutional rationale).
16. Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 273–74 & n.27 (1946) (citing seven criticisms of Erie’s constitutional
argument in addition to those discussed supra).
17. Id. at 278.
18. Id.
19. See Reut Yael Paz, A Forgotten Kelsenian? The Story of Helen Silving-Ryu (1906-1993),
25 EUR. J. INTL. L. 1123 (2014).
20. Helen Silving, Analogies Extending and Restricting Federal Jurisdiction: Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins and the Law of Conflict, 31 IOWA L. REV. 330, 339 (1946) (footnotes omitted).
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to be a jurisprudential proposition and becomes a rule of law.” 21 Silving
did not address whether Erie’s legal decision should continue to be
described as constitutional if the Supreme Court deliberately chooses not
to invoke constitutional law in its latest decision[s] applying the Erie
doctrine—as happened for eight years prior to Silving’s article and would
continue for decades afterward. 22
It would be easy enough for this essay to collect additional examples
of constitutional criticism of Erie from this period, especially because my
own doubts about Erie’s constitutional arguments are also well
documented. 23 However, this is not the place to pursue substantive
constitutional debates about Erie, and even Alfred Hill’s rare defense of
Erie’s constitutional arguments twenty years after the Court’s decision
acknowledged that “the constitutional basis of Erie has been widely
regarded as dictum, and rather dubious dictum at best.” 24 Instead, the more
immediate goal is to show that—in the years that followed Erie—
constitutional arguments shifted from being an explicitly essential part of
the Court’s holding to being a legal embarrassment that many judges,
lawyers, and commentators at the time set aside with varying levels of
grace and diplomacy.

21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Compare, e.g., Arthur John Keeffe et al., Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L. Q. 494, 524 (1949)
(“Any attempt to attack Swift v. Tyson on constitutional grounds is untenable. The argument is so
devoid of merit that even the most ardent defenders of Erie have abandoned it.”), and PURCELL, supra
note 3, at 196 (“Even many of Brandeis’s friends and admirers were disturbed. ‘I really do not like
the way [the Constitution] was handled by [Brandeis] and much preferred [the statutory argument of]
Stanley Reed,’ Judge Augustus N. Hand confessed, and Professor Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard
Law School upbraided Brandeis for ‘violating many of the canons of constitutional adjudication upon
which he has often strongly insisted.’”), and id. at 215 (quoting a letter from Felix Frankfurter to
Henry Hart: “Of course Brandeis talked of constitutionality. But is it necessary to be bound by what
he said? . . . [T]he fact that Brandeis invoked constitutional considerations does not demonstrate their
validity.”), and id. at 217 (“[Harvard Professor Zechariah Chafee, Jr.] scorned Erie’s constitutional
language as a ‘comic element’ that was ‘probably no longer accepted,’ while Brainerd Currie, another
prominent scholar, dismissed it disdainfully as ‘a bit of judicial hyperbole’ that ‘should not be
permitted to mislead even the most literal-minded reader.’”), with Craig Green, Repressing Erie’s
Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (2008) [hereinafter Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth], and Craig Green,
Erie and Problems of Constitutional Structure, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 661 (2008), and Craig Green, Can
Erie Survive as Federal Common Law?, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 813 (2013), and Green, supra note
2. See generally Symposium, Craig Green, Black-and-White Judging in a World of Grays, 46 TULSA
L. REV. 391 (2011) (discussing the operation of non-constitutional Erie analysis in the context of
Shady Grove and the Roberts Court). For extensive counter-arguments concerning Erie’s
constitutional basis, see Ernest A. Young, A General Defense of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 10
J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 17 (2013).
24. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. L. REV. 427, 427 & n.3 (19581959) (collecting many sources, predominantly opposing Erie’s constitutional rationale).
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Step two explains Erie’s emergence as a featured element of the legal
process movement. Some scholars today use provocative phrases like Our
Federalism and constitutional structure as though theories of legal
process were expressions of timeless truth. Yet this essay considers Erie’s
meaning for the legal process school as a strictly historical phenomenon.
In the spring of 1938, when Justice Brandeis wrote that Swift v. Tyson was
unconstitutional, legal process scholarship was still in its earliest stages.
During the next three decades, academics voiced broad theories and
principles about constitutional law that echoed legal process methods of
interpreting statutes based on legislative purposes and functions.25 Erie
cohered well with all of those techniques, and it was featured in the most
important teaching materials from the legal process era: Hart and
Wechsler’s casebook The Federal Courts and the Federal System. 26
Erie and legal process ideology were mutually supportive. During
Erie’s first decade of jurisprudential life, the Court’s holding had become
immensely powerful in American law, affecting thousands of cases per
year. And even though the decision’s stated rationale was contested and
vulnerable, post hoc rationales were not so hard to conjure using some
mixture of pragmatism, legal philosophy, federalism, and separation of
powers. Meanwhile, on the academic side of the ledger, many legal
process scholars resisted legal positivism and its technical obsession with
formal legal sources, instead emphasizing broader concepts such as legal
system, purpose, and institutional effectiveness. Themes from the Hart
and Wechsler paradigm simultaneously matched and reinforced Erie’s
doctrinal reconstruction as scholars analyzed Erie’s meaning without
granting decisive authority to its original text or history—just like many
courts and lawyers had done for years. As one modern historian explained,
“[f]or the generations of law students who learned federal jurisdiction
from the Hart and Wechsler casebook, the meaning of Erie was

25. For historical accounts of the decline and resurgence of various legal process ideologies,
see PURCELL, supra note 3, at 222–84; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of
The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994); Weinstein, supra note 1, at 19–21; Edward L.
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (1996); John David Ohlendorf, Purposivism Outside Statutory
Interpretation, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 235, 243–44 (2016); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The New
Legal Process: Games People Play and the Quest for Legitimate Judicial Decision Making, 77 WASH.
U. L. Q. 993, 999–1003 (1999); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 23 n.99 (2006).
26. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47
VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994); Ann Althouse, Late Night Confessions in the Hart and Wechsler Hotel,
47 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1994); Judith Resnik, Rereading “The Federal Courts”: Revising the Domain
of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021 (1994).
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powerfully, if somewhat imprecisely, etched. To those who believed in
neutral principles, Erie seemed rational and proper.” 27
John Hart Ely’s well-known article, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie,
offers a particularly fine illustration of legal process thinking scholarship
about Erie, along with responses from Abram Chayes and Paul Mishkin.
Echoing the Court’s pragmatic opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, Ely explained
that only a narrow band of Erie cases should be determined by the
application of enforceable constitutional limits—the rest should be
determined by functionalist interpretations of statutory law. 28
Chayes replied by disputing all of Ely’s doctrinal conclusions. Yet
even as he argued that “general principles—even in definitive articles—
do not decide concrete cases,” Chayes used exactly the same analytical
approach as Ely: balancing systemic interests that legal process
vocabulary characterized as neutral, objective, and firmly anchored in a
temporally transcendent now. 29 Without any detailed attention to the
Court’s original language or context, legal process arguments applying
Erie were predominantly pragmatic and forward-looking. 30 Thus, Ely and
Chayes both sought to describe a reasonable and workable balance
between state and federal law that could claim to represent a legal
consensus, despite and amid the authors’ stark disagreements about
particular substantive results.
On the surface, Paul Mishkin’s commentary seemed more attentive
to constitutional arguments and principles than earlier discussants.
Whereas Ely saw “the Constitution as having no special view on the
power of federal courts” to apply state or federal substantive law, Mishkin
wrote that “the Constitution bears not only on congressional power but
also imposes a distinctive, independently significant limit on the authority

27. PURCELL, supra note 3, at 247.
28. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 698 (1974).
29. Abram Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 753 (1974) (“The method of our
trade is to impose rational purposes on history, or at least legal history. But we are condemned to
teleology, not licensed.”); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954)
The law which governs daily living in the United States is a single system of law: it speaks
in relation to any particular question with only one ultimately authoritative voice, however
difficult it may be on occasion to discern in advance which of two or more conflicting
voices really carries authority. In the long run and in the large, this must be so.
30. So also were Henry Hart’s legal process arguments that defended Erie as “superbly right.”
PURCELL, supra note 3, at 247; see also Hart, supra note 29, at 506 (“[Erie] put an end to [Swift’s]
offense to the most basic concepts of justice according to law.”); id. at 512 (describing “the essential
rationale of the Erie opinion” as a present-tense and timeless “need of recognizing state courts as
organs of coordinate authority with other branches of the state government in the discharge of the
constitutional functions of the states”).
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of federal courts.” 31 Mishkin’s rhetoric resonates comfortably with
modern commentaries that defend Erie’s constitutional analysis. 32 Yet it
is equally important to understand that Mishkin used the term
constitutional in a particularly flexible way that, like other aspects of legal
process theory, could never satisfy the technical rigors that were later
required by formalist methodologies like constitutional originalism or
textualism. According to Mishkin:
It makes no difference . . . whether the core of Erie [is] perceived as
“Constitutional” in the sense that Congress could not validly enact a
statute entirely contrary to the Rules of Decision Act, or merely
“constitutional” in the sense that it rests upon premises related to the
basic nature of our federal system which are presupposed to govern in
the absence of clear congressional determination to change and
reallocate power within that system. 33

By describing the Constitution and the constitution as functionally
equivalent in this context, Mishkin implied that congressional politics
would have to yield to the force of legal process principles just as
obediently as would a judge’s idiosyncratic beliefs. Whatever balance the
eighteenth-century Framers had imagined concerning state and federal
power was supposed to travel fluidly through time, with nothing more
than vague and general arguments about C/constitutional principles to
sustain the trip. In turn, that eighteenth-century balance was supposed to
integrate seamlessly with Mishkin’s opinions two centuries later about
systemic traditions, necessities, and legal functionality. Citing Hart and
Sacks’s The Legal Process itself, Mishkin expounded his C/constitutional
argument without making any explicit reference to eighteenth-century text
or practice. Nor did he analyze nineteenth-century traditions and history,
which would have been dominated by the putative anti-precedent Swift v.
Tyson in any event. Like other legal process functionalists, Mishkin
instead voiced an ostensibly neutral and objective C/constitution that
ultimately matched his own perceptions and ideas, which remained
distinctively located within his own era. 34

31. Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie – The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682,
1682 (1974).
32. See infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 1686 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 1686 n.16 (citing HENRY HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1413 (tent. ed. 1958)); id. at 1686–87 (noting
as a timeless principle “the constitutional perception that courts are inappropriate makers of laws
intruding upon the states’ views of social policy in the areas of state competence” without explicitly
distinguishing one hundred years of cases under Swift v. Tyson); id. at 1687 (“[I]t is the very essence
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Step three examines Erie’s late-twentieth-century displacement from
its central position in American legal culture. Relevant factors in that
phenomenon included disputes over civil and political rights and a
substantial growth of federal public law, including administrative law.
The legal process school also confronted political challenges, insofar as
its commitments to neutral principles, reasoned discourse, and systemic
function were not always enough to satisfy public demands for racial
justice, gender equality, and federal legal protection. 35
During the 1920s and 1930s, Swift’s federal general common law had
shared legal headlines with the Court’s dramatic decisions to restrict the
Commerce Clause cases and expand individual rights to contract.36 By the
1960s and 1970s, however, issues surrounding Erie and diversity
jurisdiction seemed much less important than questions about federal law
and federal rights. Of course, Erie remained in the law school curriculum,
but for most participants, studying such materials had become a necessary
task more than a foundational struggle. 37
In 1969, the last year of Henry Hart’s life, the American Law
Institute, led by Herbert Wechsler, approved a report to reflect these
changing dynamics of jurisdictional emphasis. 38 The committee proposed
that federal courts should be “concentrated upon the adjudication of rights
created by federal substantive law,” with one commentator suggesting—
despite some tension with state courts’ concurrent jurisdiction—that
“questions of federal law are best left to the federal courts.” 39 An earlier
draft of the report claimed as a “basic proposition that federal courts
should not be called upon for the administration of state law,” which,
consistent with Erie, implied tighter statutory limits for diversity
jurisdiction. 40 Only in cases that involved federal law could members of
the federal judiciary “exercise the creative function which is essential to

of our system that once Congress has effectively enacted legislation, it need not begin again . . . to
enforce any restrictions, but may instead rely wholly on the courts to provide such enforcement.”).
35. See Hill, supra text accompanying note 25; PURCELL, supra note 3, at 272.
36. Green, supra, note 2, at 419–26 (documenting the chronology and institutions that
produced and circulated critiques of Swift alongside other Lochner-era controversies).
37. See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS
(12th ed. 2012) (discussing Erie without any discussion of constitutional issues); KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (18th ed. 2013) (providing almost no
discussion of Erie).
38. PURCELL, supra note 3, 273–84.
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968).
40. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS, OFFICIAL DRAFT, PART I (1965).
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their dignity and prestige.” 41 By contrast, “deciding [diversity] cases
under state law imposes especially laborious burdens, often greater in fact
that involved in resolving issues of federal law on which these courts may
speak with their own authority.” 42
Some modern observers might accept as self-evident the ALI’s
conclusion that “[u]niformity in application of federal law and the prompt
vindication of national rights require that the federal district courts have
original jurisdiction” for a broad range of cases about federal law, in order
to guard against “the danger that state courts will not properly apply
[federal] law, either through misunderstanding or lack of sympathy.” 43 In
1969, however, such statements were still components of a debatable
vision involving (to borrow Hart and Wechsler’s phrase) “The Federal
Courts and the Federal System.” 44 Among other things, regional
differences could often affect the public’s willingness to view federal
courts’ enforcement of federal law as “vindication” as opposed to
oppression by outsiders. As more time passed, however, the everincreasing priority afforded to federal-law cases continued to shift
attention away from Erie and the application of state law in federal
courts. 45
Alongside changes regarding the salience of state-law cases in
federal court, institutional ideas about enforcing constitutional structure
were also in flux during this period. Before 1938, federalism and
separation of powers were typically expressed as judicial mandates that
threatened to strike down, among other things, a New Deal that
conservatives saw as unacceptably new and not enough of a deal. 46 Legal
process scholars like Mishkin, however, viewed constitutional structure
as something that could be more broad and vague, emerging in contexts
where—like Erie—there was not much need to search for detailed anchors
in original text or history, and also where there was no immediate bite of
counter-majoritarian judicial review. 47

41.
42.
43.
44.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 39, at 99.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 168.
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (2015).
45. Twenty-first-century statutory provisions concerning mass torts and class actions are recent
exceptions to that principle. 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2019) (providing federal jurisdiction for certain
multiparty, multiforum tort litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012) (codifying the “Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005”).
46. Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131
HARV. L. REV. 1, 51–77 (2017).
47. See supra text and accompanying notes 31–33.
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Legal process thinkers were famously dissatisfied with positivism as
a requirement for legal sources, and they often expressed constitutional
analysis as values and dialogues instead of judicial edicts and
enforcement. One reason that legal process scholars tended to view
federal law as interstitial derived from the contexts that they choose to
study, which characteristically included areas where Congress had not
spoken or had done so with notable vagueness.
By contrast, civil rights jurists did seek direct judicial enforcement
of constitutional law through prescriptive mandates against political
branches. They were not seeking to uncover a soft-spoken network of
doctrine that somehow rendered the status-quo legal system both
operational and functional. Instead, civil rights lawyers self-consciously
mobilized institutional force in order to challenge hierarchies and
folkways, supporting ideals of equality and liberty that were often linked
more closely to a results-oriented future than a big-talking past. 48
To use Mishkin’s capitalization (one last time), late-twentiethcentury legal struggles often involved efforts to use Constitutional law in
order to revise or replace some established forms of constitutional law.
Alongside the civil rights era’s distinctive institutional focus on judicial
enforcement, jurists during this period were substantively different from
pre-New Deal constitutionalists because they focused on achieving new
applications of constitutional liberty and equality instead of older visions
of states’ rights and restricted federal power. All of these factors tended
to shift Erie’s disputes over state law and federal courts even farther
toward the sidelines.
Step four considers Erie’s twenty-first-century development as a
citable authority to support vigorous ideas from legal conservatives about
judicially imposed federalism and separation of powers. Federalism came
slightly earlier, which makes sense given its long history in twentiethcentury politics, its explicit reference in Erie’s text, and its featured
presence in Judge Harlan’s legal process concurring opinion in Hanna v.

48. Of course, the term “folkways” derives from much older scholarship concerning social
hierarchy and the contested potential for legal change. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A
STUDY OF MORES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS AND MORALS (1907). Distant and narrower echoes of such
ideas can sometimes be found in modern constitutional scholarship. Cf., e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY (2006); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? (1993).
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Plumer. 49 Over time, however, Erie’s separation-of-powers new myth has
taken center stage. 50
Erie is not the only historical context from which modern
conservatives have drawn newly urgent ideas about constitutional
federalism and separation of power, combining legal process ideas about
constitutional structure with civil rights ideas about judicial
enforceability. 51 Some advocates explicitly muster separation-of-powers
arguments under the nondelegation doctrine’s timeworn battle flag, thus
earning criticism for promoting an outdated 1930s redux. 52 On other
occasions, similar constitutional results are proposed as creative
expressions of Supremacy Clause fundamentalism. 53 And of course,
sometimes the legal sources of such arguments remain vague and
incompletely theorized, much as legal process scholars from past
generations used terms like “Our Federalism” and “The Constitutional
Structure” without fully justifying their use of possessive pronouns and
definite articles. Erie represents only one strand of a renewed emphasis
on constitutional structure that is expanding rapidly throughout a new
generation of legal conservatives, and such developments in constitutional
law and politics have already produced an extraordinary mixture of legal
process rhetoric and pre-1937 outcomes. 54
It is difficult to forecast how the full potential of Erie’s new myth
will develop in the near future. Brett Kavanaugh’s confirmation will
provide America with the most politically conservative Supreme Court
since 1937. Other federal courts include increasing numbers of
conservative judges. And longstanding conservative calls for judicial
restraint are now more than ever carefully targeted in order to restrict very
specific kinds of legal rights. Elections have consequences, we are told,

49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938) (“We merely declare that in applying
[Swift v. Tyson] that this Court and lower courts have invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the
Constitution to the several states.”); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“I have always regarded that decision as one of the modern cornerstones of our
federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the
state and federal systems.”)
50. Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, supra note 23, at 599–644; see also PURCELL, supra note
3, at 290–92 (tracing a somewhat longer history for “new-myth” efforts to connect Erie with
separation of powers).
51. See, e.g., Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013); Craig Green,
Constitutional Chevron Debates and the Transformation of American Law, __ GEO. WASH. L. REV.
__ (forthcoming 2019).
52. Metzger, supra note 44 (criticizing such efforts).
53. Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2010)
(criticizing such efforts).
54. See Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, supra note 23, at 599–644; Metzger, supra note 44.
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and new arguments about constitutional structure might be midway
toward becoming—in Jack Balkin’s evocative phrase—more on the wall
than off the wall. 55 Despite requests from some authors that the legal
community should “normalize Erie,” or at least should repress the
decision’s sprawling mythology, constitutional defenders of Erie show no
signs of changing course or losing steam. 56 If anything, the popularity and
enthusiasm of new Erie arguments concerning separation of powers might
grow stronger over time as American legal institutions shift even farther
to the right.
Step five concludes by analyzing the implications of interpreting
iconic judicial precedents for a legal system’s stability. One dramatic
development in recent decades has been the rise of formal systems for
interpreting legal authorities other than judicial precedents, most notably
including statutory textualism and constitutional originalism. In
opposition to legal process scholars, and with ardent support from
Reaganite conservatives like Justice Scalia, various kinds of interpretive
formalism have promised to increase law’s stability and legitimacy by
applying inflexible fidelity to foundational moments of lawmaking that
are thereafter deemed authoritative.
With Erie as a prime example, however, it should be clear that
precedential interpretation has not undergone any comparably formalist
shift in methodology. On the contrary, terms like precedential textualism,
precedential originalism, dynamic precedentialism, or living
55. Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J.
1407, 1446–47 (2001)
During the last five years or so, I have been consistently wrong about what the Court was
willing to do to promote its conservative agenda. Repeatedly—in cases [about judicially
enforced federalism] like City of Boerne v. Flores, which struck down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and United States v. Morrison, which struck down the Violence
Against Women Act—I have thought to myself: ‘They can’t possibly do that. That would
be crazy.’ And each time I have been proven wrong. These recalcitrant experiences
suggest to me that my own judgment about what is ‘on the wall’ and what is ‘off the wall,’
what is a good legal argument and what is wholly implausible is slowly but surely moving
out of the mainstream, if that mainstream is defined by the actual holdings of the United
States Supreme Court. My sense of what is possible and plausible, what is competent legal
reasoning and what is simply made up out of whole cloth is probably mired in an older
vision of the Constitution that owes much to the Warren and Burger Courts as well as to
the predominantly liberal legal academy in which I was educated, trained, and now teach.
Finally, I should note that as soon as each of these new Supreme Court decisions is handed
down, dozens of bright young constitutional lawyers busily begin to rationalize it, showing
how it is, after all, completely consistent with the text, structure, original intentions, values
and traditions of the American Constitution. For these legal scholars, opinions like Boerne
and Morrison are not off the wall. They are the wall. (footnotes omitted)).
56. Compare, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Normalizing Erie, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2016), with,
e.g., Young, supra note 23.
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precedentialism are just as unrecognized in practice as they are unnamed
in theory. 57 The absence of such vocabulary might cause some readers to
find the whole project of discussing interpretative methodologies for
iconic precedents somehow alienating or misplaced. However, especially
given the immense power of judicial decisions to influence the content
and character of American law, it might be useful to consider interpretive
stability and legitimacy in this context as well. Accordingly, even as
Erie’s eightieth birthday offers a useful occasion to further explore the
iconic decision itself, it also provides a useful opportunity to think more
deeply about the way that the American legal system interprets iconic
precedents as a category. 58

57. But cf. Green, supra note 3, 385–91 (introducing such methods of interpreting precedents).
58. Id. at 484
At the very heart of our legal order, the most urgent and vital question is how judges and
lawyers in ‘an indeterminate world’ can maintain what [Justice] Souter calls ‘a state of
trust,’ believing that some ‘way will be found leading through an uncertain future’ even
as the law’s future-oriented trajectory is anchored by precedents from the near and distant
past. This Article’s interpretive methodology hopes to indirectly influence how lawyers
and judges chart such paths forward. At the very least, a better understanding of
precedential interpretation should help legal agents to recognize the dilemmas they face
and techniques that are available along the way.
(quoting Justice David H. Souter, Harvard University’s 359th Commencement Address, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 429, 430 (2010)).
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